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,JACK W. BRAD8HAW, Aplwllant., v. UAfjll<'Ol~NIA BM.
PLOYMI<JN'r STABILlZAT!ON COMMISSION et al.,
Hespondents.
[1] Unemployment Insurance-Purpose.-The state's purpose in
providing unemployment insurance is to reduce involuntary
unemployment and the suffering caused thereby to a minimul!l.
(Unempl. Ins. Code, § 100.)
[2] !d.-Right to Benefits.-An unemployed person who satisfies
the requirements of the Unemployment Insurance Act is entitled to receive from the Unemployment Fund payments
reasonably sufficient to tide him over until he can secure employment.
[3] !d.-Right to Benefits-Dismissal Pay.-An award of unemployment benefits to a discharged employee for a period equal
to the number of days' dismissal pay he received would
duplicate such dismissal payments.
[4] !d.-Right to Benefits-When Employee Deemed Unemployed.
-Unempl. Ins. Code, § 1252, declaring that an individual is
"unemployed" in any week during which he performs no
services and with respect to which no wages are payable to
him, contemplates that wage payments are to be allocated to
specific periods, and the week "with respect to which" a wage
payment is made by an employer to an employee depends
on provisions of the employment contract.
[5] !d.-Right to Benefits--Duplication of Payments.-Interpretations of employment contracts and of the Unemployment Insurance Act that result in duplication of payments to a discharged
employee are not encouraged.
[6] !d.-Right to Benefits-Duplication of Payments.-The policy
against duplication of payments to a discharged employee
should not be thwarted by any so-called liberal construction of
the Unemployment Insurance Act, especially when such construction is not justified by language of the employment
contract.
[7] Id.-Purpose.-Unemployment insurance was not intended to
protect employees already protected for the same period by
their private contracts.
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr. Supp. (1950 Rev.), Unemployment Relief
-Insurance Act, § 3.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 7] Unemployment Insurance, § 2;
[2-6, 8-10] Unemployment Insurance, § 18.5.
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[9 J Id.~Right to Benefits-Dismissal Pay.~-Thc receipt of dispay temporarily disqualifies an
from claiming
insurance benefits.
flO J !d.-Right to Benefits-Dismissal Pay.~An employee's cont radual right to dismis:Sal paynwnts is not impaired by d1myhim unemployment benefits for a period equal to tlu~
of days' dismissal pay he received.

from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
and County of San l<'rancisco. H. A. van der Zee, Judge.
Proeeeding in mandamus to review an order of the Iusuraw·e Appeals Board denying a elaim for unemployment
insnranee benefits. ,Judgment for defendants on sustaining
denuuTer to petition, affirmed.
IlFrbert Pothier, Marcel E. Cerf, Robinson & IJeland for
Arthur .J. Goldberg, Nutter & Smith, Ralph Nutter and
Charl1•s P. Scully as Amici Cnriae on behalf of Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Irving H. Perluss,
Assistant Attorney General, William L. Shaw and Vincent P.
Lafferty, Deputy Attorneys General, Cooper, \Vhite & Cooper,
Sheldon G. Cooper, George A. Helmer, Robert M. Raymer
and Hichard Logan for Respondents.
Downey, Brand, Seymour & Rohwer, Clyde H. Brand and
.J. Hi··hard Glad'~ as Amici Curiae on behalf of Hespondents.
J.-'l'he petitioner-appellant appeals from a judgment entered after an order sustaining a demurrer to his
for a writ of mandate to vacate a decision of thr
California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board denying
his claim for unemployment insurance benefits.
For reasons of economy the petitioner was discharged from
his
with the San Francisco Chronicle on or about NoYember 29, 1952. Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreeJnent between hiR union and the Chronicle, he received upon
46 C.2d-20
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in addition to his
fraction
his next
as of the
of his dis"vacation
') ;
pay m
lieu of two ·weeks' notice; and
"dismissal
' in an
amount
upon his length of service.
The
filed for
insurance
The claims examiner of the
of Employment
decided that since he had received vacation pay, pay in
of notice and dismissal pay
to his
for 41%
he ·would not
for benefits until 41%
working
after his discharge. After a
a Department of En1ployment referee affirmed the denial of benefits.
'rhe Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board in turn affirmed the referee's decision and denied benefits. Bradshaw
petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate under
Code of Civil Procedure, section 1094.5, to vacate the decision
of the Appeals Board and grant him benefits for the 41%
days covered
the supplemental payments. A demurrer
to the petition was sustained, Bradshaw elected not to amend
and judgment 1vas entered for the respondents.
The petitioner does not now contest the decisions denying
him benefits because he received vacation pay and pay in
lieu of notice. This court will therefore consider only the
propriety of denying unemployment benefits for a period equal
to the number of days' dismissal pay he received.
This case calls for an interpretation of section 1252 of the
Unemployment Insurance Code. In part, that section provides: "An individual is 'unemployed' in any week during
which he performs no serYices and with respect to which no
wages are payable to him . . . . '' Section 1251 provides
that unemployment compensation benefits are payable to
"unemployed individuals." It is conceded by the petitioner
that dismissal payments under the contract are "wages"
within the meaning of that term as used in section 1252.
'l'he question then is whether dismissal payments are payable
"with respect to" a period before the employee's date of
discharge or ''with respect to'' a period after that date. The
petitioner contends that dismissal payments are made "with
respect to'' the weeks during which he admittedly performed
services for the Chronicle. The respondents contend that
such payments are made "with respect to' the weeks following the petitioner's discharge. Decisions in other states
on the subject herein discussed are not helpful. It is stated
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guage alone is insufficient to establish that the dismissal
payments were made ''with respect to'' a period before discharge and thus would not be duplicated by an award of
unemployment compensation.
[9] A holding that dismissal payments should be disregarded in determining whether an employee is entitled to
unemployment benefits would create an anomalous distinction
between dismissal pay on the one hand and ''in lieu of notice
pay" and "vacation pay" on the other. There is authority
in this state to the effect that the receipt of "vacation pay"
or "in lien of notice pay" temporarily disqualifies an employee from claiming unemployment insurance benefits. (See
Shand v. California Emp. Stab. Com., 124 Cal.App.2d 54
r268 P.2d 193]; Jones v. California Ernp. Stab. Com., 120
Cal.App.2d 770 [262 P.2d 91] .) By analogy dismissal pay
should have the same effect. The petitioner, however, notes
that in Gilliam v. California Ernp. Stab. Corn., 130 Cal.App.
2d 102 [278 P.2d 528], one sort of supplemental payment
was held not to disqualify the recipient from claiming unemployment insurance benefits. In that case the employees
had the option of working without vacation and receiving pay
in lieu thereof. Upon discharge they were given pay in lieu
of a vacation they had not taken during a prior period. The
court distinguished the Shand and ,Jones cases by pointing
out that in those cases the employee while he was employed
did not have the option of taking extra pay in lieu of vacation
-he could only be sure of getting that extra pay if he was
discharged. The factual situation was obviously different
in the Gilliam case, and the court there concluded that ''in
lieu" vacation payments could be allocated to a period before
discharge notwithstanding the Shand and ,Jones cases. The
petitioner contends that dismissal pay is more analogous to
"in lien" vacation pay than to the normal vacation pay
inYolved in the Shand and .Jones caRes. This contention is
untenable. As noted, the basis for the Gilliam award was
the employee's option while he was employed to receive the
supplemental payments. In contrast, the dismissal payments
made to the petitioner were not available to him unless and
nntil his employment was terminated.
The petitioner complains that the Unemployment Insurance
Appeals Board has taken inconsistent positions with respect
to the treatment of dismissal pay. It is said that when determining whether a claimant has qualified for benefits by earning sufficient money during a base period prior to his discharge

Co~r.
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,
Board
when it is received. It
"'"'"n''"'t~r of the board's practice
the purpose of determining tbe
"'""'"''"' the base
is not involved
Both contracting parties contend that the allocation
the opposition is in violation of the constitutional
against impairment of the obligation of contracts.
"ffi~'"''"" of the judgment in
ease will not affect the
the petitioner under his employment contract. His
dismissal payments will not be impaired. Nor would
be forced to make two payments under the
:~.-nlr'""''"r''~" contract in the event of a reversal.
is concluded that the Appeals Board and the superior
properly construed the statute and held that, as a matter
law on the undisputed facts, the receipt of dismissal pay
prevented the petitioner from qualifying for
benefits.
The judgment is affirmed.

J., and McComb, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the judgment and, generally,
opinion except insofar as it may be deemed to indicate
of GilUam v. California Emp. Stab. Oom. (1955),
Cal.App.2d 102 [278 P.2d 528].
J.-I dissent.
majority opinion fails to give the liberal construction
of unemployment insurance laws ( Gania v. IndusAc:e. Oom., 41 Cal.2d 689, 693 (263 P.2d 8] ), ignores
ature of dismissal pay and is contrary to the trend of
elsewhere. It seems clear to me that where, as
compensation for services performed is deferred until
an employee is discharged, and then paid to him, it
not constitute payment for such services during any
f time after discharge with respect to which wages
to him and hence he is entitled to unemployment
peJasa,twn under Unemployment Insurance Code, section
from the date of his discharge.
must examine the collective bargaining agreement under
petitioner was entitled to dismissal pay, vacation pay
two weeks' notice of discharge or pay, because the nature

DISMISSAL PAY.
vVhen an
other
from the terms of this contract as
he shall receive a cash dismissal payment in a
s~on in accordance with the following schedule
years of continuous and
employment: ....
''
From the dismissal pay the publisher may deduct
any
or tax to which the employee is subject under local,
state or federal legislation.
''
Dismissal pay shall be computed at the highest weekly
salary (exclusive of bonuses and payments for special work)
for the fifty-two (52) weeks previous to discharge . . . .
VACATIONS.
Employees shall receive one week's vacation
with pay after six months' continuous employment; two
weeks' vacation with pay after one year's continuous employment. Employees who have been continuously employed
for three years as of October 15th in the year which his vacation is scheduled shall receive three weeks' vacation with
pay." (Emphasis added.) Thus it is seen the dismissal pay
is payable in a lump sum and is computed on the length of
prior service and the amount of pay during that service. This
is, in effect, a payment of deferred wages or wages held back
by the employer. It is not pay for the future after the
employee is discharged. It is somewhat analogous to pensions
which are considered as deferred compensation for services
already rendered. (Wallace v. City of Fresno, 42 Cal.2d
180, 184 [265 P.2d 884] .) No doubt, in the negotiations leading to the agreement in fixing wages, consideration was given
to the dismissal pay.
In the above light we look at section 1252 which provides:
''An individual is 'unemployed' in any week during which
he performs no services and with respect to which no wages
are payable to him . . . . "
(Unempl. Ins. Code, § 1252.)
The employee-petitioner-performed no services and no
wages were paid to him with respect to any week during
which he performed no services because the dismissal pay
was not for time after the discharge, it being deferred wages,
and was not allocated to any week after discharge because
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seems
is allowed in this
will be a donble payment for the same thingidleness-one from the state and the other from
That is not true. Assuming that the sums
are for unemployment, still it
to say that it is in addition to unemployment
inasmuch as the latter is no more than a bare
subsistence. Moreover, the argument of the majority is based
false premise that unemployment compensation is
where the employee is nee(1y when obviously his
stauding has nothing to do with it. He is entitled
compensation no matter how much he is 1vorth and,
the sum payable under the agreement is in effect
savings from his past wages vvhere the employer
banker. He is not, therefore, being paid double, for
under thr agreement is from his own money.
if the employer had deposited a portion of the
's >Yages in a trust fund to be
to him only in
of unemployment, it coulcl not be claimed that he
entitled to unemployment compensation. The proviwell as the improvident employee is entitled to uncompensation under the hnv. vVhy should he be
less so when he is provident because an agreement
between his union and his rmployer 1nakes him so with the
coopPrat ion of his employer
construction of the statui e in ael'ord with the above
has been foll!YWe<l in other states. In Ackct-son v_
Union Tel.
2:l4 Minn. 271
N.W.2(1 338], it
held that employees diseharged hel'ause of mechanizatiou
"severance" pay based on the period of prior
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service under a collective bargaining agreement, the same as
the dismissal pay here, were entitled to unemployment compensation under an unemployment compensation statute the
same as ours. The court said: ''Section 268.04, subd. 23,
provides that an individual shall be deemed unemployed in
any week in which he performs no service and with respect
to which no wages are payable to him. It is clear that from
the use of the conjunctive 'and,' before an individual may
be deemed to be unemployed, two things must exist : ( 1) He
must perform no service during the week; and (2) he must
be paid no wages for the week. In the case now before us,
the first of those requirements clearly exists. Upon election
to receive severance pay, the employment was completely
severed. No claim is made that other employment was obtained. The employe was registered for work. So far as
her former employer was concerned, she could do as she
pleased from the date of separation. Relator claims, however, that the second prerequisite to 'unemployment' is lacking, in that severance pay constitutes wages for the number
of weeks following the employe's separation which have been
used to compute the amount thereof. . . . Suffice to say that
it is the declared public policy of our state, as shown by the
legislative declaration of public policy in the act, § 268.03,
that benefits are intended to extend to those who are unemployed through no fault of their own. . . . In the case now
before us, relator was not only legally obligated under its
contract to make the severance payments upon the election of
the discharged employes to receive them, but the payments
were not designated as wages for a specific future period of
time. . . . Severance pay was in no way related to or dependent upon the employe's employment status after separation. She received the payment even though she might
secure a job the next day. It is true that the amount was
measured by the length of service, but there may have been
many reasons for adopting the length of service as the yardstick in determining the amount of severance pay clue a discharged employe. . . . It is undoubtedly true that one of
the objectives of dismissal or severance pay, such as we have
to deal with here, is to ease the employe's financial burden
while looking for a new job. However, there are other
objectives which we must al!'lo keep in mind in considering
the nature of such payment. Partial compensation for loss
of seniority rights; loss of ]HJSKiblP pension rights; compenKation for retraining or acquiring new skills; and many others
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sm:h
tlw continued servir1~ of its
when :meh sel'Vi(~<'S eould be di;.;lwnsed witlL
thut to allow claimants io n~eover henP-

eiremnstances is to penalize rdator by
Llouble
ullder the contract, namely, paypay, and the adverse cffeet it "Will haYe upon
trihution rate to the unemployment compensa'l'Imt may yery lYell be true, hut it strikes us that
whid1 more properly should be addressed to
than to the courts. JJikewise, relator argues
of benefits gives the employe double benefits m·
in allowing her to receive severance pay and at
time eolleet unemployment benefits. 'fhat may or
he
depending upon the construction placed
na1nre of the severance pay. In a11y r·vent, it is true,
of the employment status of the employe after
If she procured a new position the day after
she would retain her severance pay and the wages
and no one would contend that she should not be
to rrtain both. Unemployment compensation is
intended to take the place of wages which could have
llad Rhc been employcct." (Ackerson v. 1Vestcrn
234 Minn. 271 [48 N.W.2ct 338, 340-342].)
same effect are Western Union Tel. Co. v. Texas
., (Tex.CiY.App.) 243 S.W.2r1 217; Dubois \'.
~'~''''r""' Com., -- - Me. - - [114 A.2d 35!1] ;
Mim:ng Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Boanl of
I'a.Snpcr. 2G6 [75 A.2d 8]. It has been well
the Ackerson case, supt·a: "First, need or
is not a requircmeut for eligibility for emuReceipt of income from other sources does not
a claimant, for the purpose of these laws is to
a person's resources during periods of unemSeeond, the claimant concededly would have resevcrance payment eYen if she had obtained a new
npon dismissal. 'l'hird, the contract specifi-

nn'"'fl'"" that the severance pay

to dismissal.
inclusion of a
gr<~ellrleilts extend be's immediate finanSeverance pay is
for loss of seniority
rights, and compensation for
the latter
especially
case. From the employer's viewclauses are included as a means of
both as to workers and to the com'l'hese factors strongly suggest that the parties to
the contract intended the severance payment clause to have
no relation to the worker's employment status after dismissal,
and, more significantly, that the court reached the proper
result in concluding that, in view of the terms of the contract,
there should be no relation between eligibility for unemployment compensation and receipt of severance pay." (100 U.
Pa.L.Rev. 144, 145; see also 64 IIarv.L.Rev. 681.)
The question here involved has broad implications in view
of the so-called guaranteed annual wage arrangements which
have been made notably in the automobile industry. In the
Ford contract for illustration, there is a provision for payment to the employee when involuntarily laid off and such
payment is defined as a supplementation which means the
right to receive both payment from the employer and unemployment compensation from the state without reduction.
Under unemployment insurance laws similar to ours, the state
officials have said that such supplementation is proper in
Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey
and New York. (2 C.C.H. Unemp. Ins. Rep. (Conn.) para.
8380; id. (Del.) para. 8088; 4 id. (Mass.), para. 8188; id.
(Mich.) para. 8522; 5 id. (N.J.) para. 8271; 36 Lab. ReL Rep.
715; 69 Harv.L.Rev. 362.) The attorney general of this state
ruled on February 10, 1956, that the employer's payment under
the Ford plan does not render the employee ineligible for unemployment compensation under our law. (27 Ops. Cal. Atty.
Gen. 71.) The common theory in those determinations is
that the payments by the employer are not wages paid with
respect to the IYeek for which unemployment compensation is
sought. These official rulings should not be lightly brushed
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